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                                                                       Abstract 
Using a national survey of U.S farm households, this paper investigates the 
interrelationship among the decisions to work off the farm by the operator and the spouse, and 
participation in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The effects of these three decisions on 
farm household income are also examined. By estimating a heteroscedastic household income 
function, we identify the effects of participating in these activities on the average level of farm 
household income and its variation within each sub-group of farms involved in the several 
combinations of activities.  
 
Our empirical results support the hypothesis that participation in the CRP and decisions 
to work off the farm by the operator and the spouse are made jointly rather than independently. 
The operators’ decisions to work off the farm and to participate in CRP increase the mean level 
of the household income, while the spouses’ decisions to work off the farm help decrease the 
variation in household income among households in that sub-group.  
 




  2Background 
For years, improvements in the well being of farm households have been possible 
through the interaction between technological adoption that released labor from farms and 
economic growth that pulled labor off farms. The dependence of farm households on income 
from non-farm sources has increased steadily, narrowing, or actually reversing, the gap between 
incomes of farm and non-farm households. According to ERS data, off-farm income is now the 
largest component of farm household income, about $120 billion at the start of the new 
millennium; net income from farming is only about $50 billion.   
Until the mid-1980s, changes in the composition of farm household income occurred 
against the backdrop of a commodity-oriented farm policy. Through the conservation compliance 
provisions of the 1985 farm bill, environmental goals were elevated along side commodity policy 
objectives. Spending on an expanded number of provisions offering incentives to participate in 
environmentally related programs will rise by 80% under the new farm legislation—to a 10-year 
total of $38.6 billion. The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the largest Federal program 
targeting land use, pays farmers $2 billion a year to remove 34 million acres from production.  
Although CRP payments are small compared with off-farm income, both may be 
attractive to farm households for similar reasons. Each can be a significant source of reliable 
income to farm households not directly related to the agricultural production, a characteristic that 
may gain significance as commodity-related farm support is reduced and farmers’ are exposed to 
greater market price risk. Moreover, CRP and off-farm work remove substantial resources from 
agricultural production. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the decisions are interrelated. 
With this as a working hypothesis, one primary purpose of this paper is to determine if 
the decisions of farm operators and their spouses to work off the farm are made jointly and in 
  3conjunction with participating in the CRP. We extend the analysis to determine how these 
decisions interact with socio-economic characteristics of the farm and farm household to affect 
the well-being of farm households, as measured by farm household income, and its variability 
among farm households with common characteristics. Our empirical analysis is based on 2001 
data from the USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS). This is the annual 
national survey of farm households. 
There has been considerable research on decisions to work off the farm
1 and to 
participate in programs such as the CRP,
 2 but our study is unique in several respects. Although 
both these decisions to work off the farm and the decision to participate in CRP remove 
substantial resources from agricultural production, there has been no attempt to investigate the 
extent to which they are determined jointly or independently. It is important to test for jointness 
when more than two choices are considered, but there is a high cost in terms of model estimation 
due to the high dimension computations associated with multivariate distributions. 
Using the results from the choice modeling, we are able to control for the endogeneity of 
these decisions in estimating a farm-household income function.
3 Furthermore, we extend 
previous analyses by estimating a heteroscedastic income function to identify any systematic 
effects of decisions to participate in CRP and to work off the farm on farm household income and 
its variability across households with similar characteristics. Such a heteroscedastic specification 
has been used by Low and Ormniston (1991) to examine the effects of schooling on the mean 
and variance in earnings, and by Mullahy and Sindelar (1995) to examine the effects of poor 
                                                 
1The literature considering off-farm work by the farm operator as a single binary choice is extensive, and it is 
summarized effectively in Hallberg, et al. (1991). Recently, there has been a growing body of research documenting 
the likelihood that the decisions of the operator and the spouse to work off the farm are determined jointly (Huffman 
and Lange (1989); Gould and Saupe (1989); Kimhi (1994); Lim-Applegate, et al. (2002); Kwon, et al. (2002)). 
2 For example, Duke (2004) found evidence of the joint nature of decisions by farm households to participate in 
Delaware’s farmland retention programs and federal environmental programs, including CRP and EQIP. 
3 Huffman (1991) underscores the need for this specification of a farm household income function.  
  4health and alcoholism on family income variability. Ours is also the first study to control for 
potential endogenous participation decisions in such a heteroscedastic specification through a 
modified treatment effects model in which the predicted probabilities of participation are used as 
instrumental variables for the three binary choice indicators.  
We proceed by outlining a household production model that helps to establish the linkage 
between the choice modeling and the specification of the income function. A discussion of the 
econometric choice model is by the specification of the heteroscedastic income function as an 
endogenous treatment effects model. After then describing the data used and discussing the 
results, we conclude with a brief summary and a discussion of important policy conclusions.  
Conceptual Framework 
 To focus on the essence of these three combined choices, we assume that all decisions 
are made by the operator and the spouse of the farm household, denoted by an m and s, 
respectively. There are fixed endowments of farmland ( A) and of time for both the operator ( m E ) 
and the spouse ( s E ). For each of them, time is allocated to leisure ( ), farm production 
( ), and off-farm work ( ). Land is allocated between crop production (A), and CRP 
(A








m L L ,
e). The household receives income from several sources: agricultural product sales, off-farm 
work at respective off-farm wage ( ) for both the operator and spouse, CRP payment per 
acre payments (P
s m w w ,
e), and decoupled farm payments, (M). Finally, we assume that utility depends 
not only on farm household consumption (x) and leisure, but also the improvement in 
environmental quality (e) generated by land committed to CRP. Agricultural production, y, 
depends on land and labor, where   is a well-behaved concave production 
function. To reflect the risky environment in agricultural production, we assume that the 





  5commodity price, P, is random;  η + = P P , where P  is the expected price and the random error 





Given this specification of farm production technology, the agricultural household 
maximizes expected utility, subject to a full income constraint, a time constraint, and an acreage 
constraint. The maximization problem can be written as: 
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We can eliminate lm, ls, and x by substituting equations (2 through 5) into equation (1). The 
choice variables are land in CRP (Ae), labor in off-farm work by the operator and spouse 
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Assuming an interior solution for all endogenous variables, except for ( ), the first-
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4 To make the analysis tractable, we follow Fabella (1989) and assume that the marginal utilities of leisure and CRP 
land are independent. That is: UAeL = ULAe = 0. 
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where Ui is the first-order derivative of the utility function with respect to argument i. The 
optimal levels of (Ae, , ) for the agricultural household are given by the 
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To interpret the economic intuition of the first order conditions, we first focus on the off-
farm labor decisions. Equations (8) and (9) provide the optimal conditions for off-farm hours 
worked by the operator and spouse, respectively. If the hours worked off the farm of the 
operator/spouse are positive, labor is allocated to off-farm work up to the point where the ratio of 
the expected marginal utility of leisure to the expected marginal utility of consumption is equal 
to the respective off-farm wage (wm / ws). If a corner solution obtains for either the operator or 
spouse, the ratio of the expected marginal utility of leisure to the expected marginal utility of 
consumption may be greater than the off-farm wage. 
To interpret the first-order conditions, we must take the expectations of equations (7), 
(10), and (11). Similar to Isik (2002), we approximate the utility function with a second-order 
Taylor series expansion, which does not impose constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). By 
taking expectations and applying the appropriate approximation (Bohrnstedt and Goldberger 
  7(1969)), then substituting these expressions for expected values and covariances into equations 
(7), (10), and (11), the first-order necessary conditions of these three equations are now:
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The parameter (φ ) is the Arrow-Pratt’s measure of absolute risk aversion.
6  
The economic intuition behind equation (7’) is straightforward. The optimal CRP acreage 







) equals the mean opportunity cost of land in agricultural production adjusted for 
the risk premium ( A A ff f p
2
η φσ − ). From equation (10’), the operator allocates labor to 





m ) is equal to the 
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2
η φσ − ).  Equation (11’) is a similar expression for the spouse.  
After solving equations (7’), (8), (9), (10’), and (11’) simultaneously for the reduced form 
expressions for the endogenous variables ( ), and substituting them into 
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5 The derivations of equations (7’), (10’), and (11’) are in Chang (2006). To focus on CRP participation, we assume 
the both the operator and the spouse allocate some time to the farm business.  
6 For simplicity, we assume risk attitudes of the operator and the spouse are the same. 
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 To make a transition of equation (12) to the empirical analysis, several issues need to be 
addressed. Since equation (12) can also be viewed as a reduced form, representing household 
income (x) in terms of the off-farm wages ( ), per-acre CRP payment (p s m w w , e) and other 
exogenous variables, off-farm wages ( ) and per-acre CRP payment (p s m w w , e) are only observed 
for those who have chosen to work off the farm or participate in CRP. Household income, on the 
other hand, is observable for all observations in our data.  
In order to retain all sample observations in the data set in the empirical estimation of an 
income function, we adopt an approach similar to one discussed by Goodwin and Holt (2002) in 
which the (potentially unobservable) wages (and CRP payments in our case) are replaced in 
equation (12) by what their determinants would be in wage and payment functions. This would 
yield inequalities corresponding to an empirical representation of the participation conditions 
implied by the first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions, equations (7) through (9) above. In so doing, 
we reflect the fact that for those operators or spouses who choose not to work off the farm, their 
reservation wage (or benefit) for not working off the farm is higher than the market wage. This is 
consistent with the corner solutions to equations (8) and (9).  A similar argument applies to being 
able to reflect the fact that for those not participating in CRP (a corner solution to equation (7)), 
the opportunity cost of land in production is higher than the potential CRP payment.           
Given an estimated discrete choice structure, it is also necessary to determine the best 
way to reflect these endogenous choices in the empirical specification of the farm household 
income function (equation (12)). Since we would lose important information by trying to 
estimate separate income functions for sub-groups of participants in various combinations of 
choices, it is not appropriate to adopt the standard sample selection model by Heckman (1979).  
  9In contrast to the sample selection model focusing on sub-samples, we are able to focus 
on the entire sample by developing a model embodying three endogenous treatment effects, one 
corresponding to each of the binary choices. Under the endogenous treatment effect model 
framework, the unobservable off-farm wage for the operator or the spouse or the per-acre CRP 
payment is replaced by the binary choice index for each choice, which is consistent with the first 
order Kuhn-Tucker conditions from the theory above. Vella and Verbeek (1999) suggest 
accommodating these endogenous treatment effects by adding the appropriate Inverse Mills 
Ratios to the household income function, along with the binary indicators of choices. This 
strategy provides efficient estimates of the parameters, but when dealing with a three-choice 
model, it is difficult to derive empirical expressions for these generalized Inverse Mills Ratios. 
Therefore, as an alternative, we reflect these endogenous choices in the empirical model below 
by using the estimated predicted probabilities of each choice as instrumental variables for these 
three binary choice indexes. The details of this specification are discussed in the next section.   
Econometric Framework  
  In this section, we first specify an econometric framework to model the combined 
decision process. We then specify an income function that accounts for the fact that income is 
determined along with the endogenous choices from the choice model.   
Joint Decisions Process  
Following the random utility framework by McFadden (1981), we specify each 
participation decision as a binary probit choice, but we allow for the correlation between each 
pair of choices (Figure 1).  Each decision is assumed to be determined by the comparison of the 
net benefit between participation and non-participation in each activity. More precisely, the CRP 
participation decision is determined by the reservation per acre return (perhaps risk adjusted) to 
the farm household of retaining the land in production with the government’s potential payment 
  10for land in the conservation reserve program (CRP). The off-farm job decisions of the farm 
operator and the spouse are determined by comparing the potential off-farm market wage for 
each with the respective shadow values of time (again perhaps risk adjusted) in farming. The 
specifications for these three equations are:    
(13)   and    r r r
r e X A P + = g g g
g e X A P + =
(14a)   and    rop op r rop
r
op u S B W + = gop gop gop
g
op u S B W + =
(14b)   and    rsp rsp sp r
r
sp u S B W + = gsp gsp gsp
g
sp u S B W + =
where P
r and P
g represent the reservation per acre return, and the potential government per acre 
payment of CRP; (Wop
r, Wop
g) represent the shadow values for farm labor, and the off-farm wage 
for the operator;  and (Wsp
r, Wsp
g) represent the shadow values of the farm labor, and the off-farm 
wage for the spouse. The vectors Xr, Xg, Srop, Sgop, Srsp, and Sgsp are the exogenous variables, and 
er, eg , urop, ugop, ursp, and ugsp, are the random disturbance terms.  
The latent binary choice variables (I1*, I2*, I3*) for the decisions are:  
(15)    1 1 1 1 ' ) ( ' ' * e X H e e X A X A P P I r g r r g g
r g + = − + − = − =




op + = − + − = − =




sp + = − + − = − =
where the subscript 1 refers to the CRP decision; subscripts 2 and 3 refer to the off-farm job for 
the operator and spouse, respectively. If the joint distribution of (e1, e2, e3) is trivariate normal, 
the joint distribution of these three error structures can be specified as: 
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  11captures the joint nature of any pair of decisions.  
Since only the actual binary indicator of each decision, Ii , is observed, the observation 
rules for the latent decision variables are: Ii  = 1 (the farmer participates in activity i) iff   Ii* > 0 ; 
and Ii  = 0  (the farmer does not participate in activity i) iff   Ii* < 0 (for i = 1, 2, and 3). Given 
this choice structure, eight potential outcomes (or regimes) can be realized in the data. Based on 
the observed outcome of each regime, we can define the probability for participating in each 
regime as a trivariate cumulative normal distribution. For example, the probability of the regime 
for those households who participate in all three activities can be shown as:   
 (16)   
3 2 1
''
23 13 12 3 2 1
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where    is the cumulative distribution of the trivariate normal distribution. By defining 
constants, k
(.) Φ
1, k2 and k3 as (2I1-1), (2I2-1), and (2I3-1), respectively, we can indicate the regime in 
which the farm household participates. The generalization of the probability of each regime is: 
] , , , ' , ' , ' [ 23 3 2 13 3 1 12 2 1 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 ρ ρ ρ k k k k k k X H k X H k X H k Φ .Combining the probability of these 
eight regimes, the maximum likelihood estimator of the three-choice model is based on the log 
likelihood function: 
(17)        .  ] , , , ' , ' , ' [ log log 23 3 2 13 3 1 12 2 1 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1
1





To estimate equation (17), we use the approach based on the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-
Keane (GHK) simulator. It is unbiased for any given number of replications; it generates 
substantially smaller variances than other simulators; and it has been shown to be the most 
  12unambiguously reliable method for simulating normal probabilities (Hajivassiliou, et al. 1996).
7 
By simulating the multivariate normal probability in the likelihood, it provides a practical 
alternative to numerical evaluation of the probability integrals.  
Identifying the Effects of these Three Combined Decisions on Farm Household Income  
To be consistent with the household production model, it is reasonable in specifying an 
income equation to account for the endogeneity of each binary choice with farm household 
income. Furthermore, the theory also suggests that participation in CRP and in off farm work 
would affect the differences in incomes across households with similar characteristics.  
By specifying a traditional treatment effects model regarding each decision as a special 
treatment, the binary choice variable (a zero-one variable) for each decision should be included 
as an explanatory variable of the income equation:  
(18)     t t t e I d I d I d X Y + + + + = 3 3 2 2 1 1 * * * ' β ,  
where Yt is the farm household income and Xt is a vector of factors affecting mean income, Ii (i = 
1,…,3) are the binary choice (zero-one) variables for the three decisions, and et is an error term. 
Because these choices and farm household income are endogenous, in part due to 
unobserved factors affecting both income and the participation decisions, ordinary least squares 
(OLS) would produce inconsistent estimators of the parameters in equation (18). We deal with 
this issue by following the logic outlined above at the end of the discussion of the theoretical 
model. That is, we control for the endogenous participation decisions (and use them as 
appropriate indicators of off-farm wages and CRP payments in the empirical counterpart to 
equation (12)) through a modified treatment effect model. We incorporate the estimated 
probabilities of participation as instruments for three binary choice indicators into equation (18).    
                                                 
7 See Train (2003) for a comprehensive review of all available simulators used in empirical analysis. 
  13By using these instrumental variables to estimate this model, the farm household income 
equation for the entire sample can be specified as:   
(19)     ,   t t t e X H d X H d X H d X Y + Φ + Φ + Φ + = ) ' ˆ ( * ) ' ˆ ( * ) ' ˆ ( * ' 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 β
From the trivariate probit choice model estimated above, the marginal probabilities (for 
participation in CRP, and for off-farm work by the operator and the spouse) are  , 
and , respectively. Since each predicted probability is correlated with the 
binary choice variable, but not with farm household income and each is a continuous variable, 
the (OLS) estimator of equation (19) produces consistent estimates for (
) ' ˆ ( 1 1 X H Φ
) ' ˆ ( 2 2 X H Φ ) ' ˆ ( 3 3 X H Φ
3 2 1 , , , d d d β ). 
To account for systematic effects of these decisions on the variance of farm household 
income among farms with similar characteristics, we specify a heteroskedastic income function:  
(20)       t t t u X H d X H d X H d X Y + Φ + Φ + Φ + = ) ' ˆ ( ) ' ˆ ( ) ' ˆ ( ' 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 β
              t t t X H r X H r X H r K g u ε α )] ' ˆ ( ) ' ˆ ( ) ' ˆ ( ' [ 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
2 / 1 Φ + Φ + Φ + =
where u is the disturbance term with a zero mean and variance, Var (ut) = σu
2 = g(.), under the 
assumption that E (εt) = 0 and Var (εt) = 1. The function g
½ (.) determines the variance in income, 
where Kt is the vector of explanatory variables. Other variables are as in equation (19). 
          We estimate equation (20) using maximum likelihood methods. Since appropriate initial 
values of the parameters are crucial for the MLE method, we do use parameter estimates of 
equation (20) derived using the three-step method originally developed by Just and Pope (1979) 
as starting values to gain the efficiency in the MLE estimation. If the error term in (20) follows a 
standard normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance, income is distributed as:  
(21)      (.)) ), ' ˆ ( ) ' ˆ ( ) ' ˆ ( ' ( ~ 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 g X H d X H d X H d X N Y t t Φ + Φ + Φ + β
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The primary farm household data used in this paper are from the 2001 Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey (ARMS), conducted by the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS) of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). By including data on 
the farm household (e.g. non-farm assets, non-farm income, demographics, etc.), the ARMS data 
provide the basis for assessing changes in the well being of farm households nationwide.  
Since one of the primary objectives of this paper is to understand the participation 
decisions in CRP and off-farm work by farm households, we limit our attention to the sample of 
farm households, and we exclude some large corporate operations, etc. We also limit our 
attention to farms classified as crop farms. The lion’s share of CRP acreage is found on crop 
farms. A summary of the sample statistics for the variables used in this analysis is in Table 1.To 
gain some perspective on the nature of these combined decisions on the sample of farms, the 
frequencies of CRP participation and off-farm work by the operator and spouse are in Table 2.  
Although the ARMS data base contains valuable information on the farm operation and 
farm household, it lacks information on land quality on the farm, local area economic 
characteristics, and certain aspects of the physical terrain, the quality of the area’s land base, or 
other conditions related to the environment that likely affect decisions to participate in the CRP 
and to work off the farm. To compensate for this lack of data, we also rely on some data from 
additional sources. The economic characteristics of local area, for example, are merged into our 
ARMS data set. These are county-level data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis income files 
in 2000, the Bureau of Economic Analysis employment files in 2000, the Bureau of Labor 
  15Statistics, and the 1990 Census of Population, STF-3 file. Three variables representing land 
quality at the county level in which the farm is located are also used. We define the land quality 
as the product of a variable reflecting the length of the growing season and the land capability 
class. (see Darwin and Ingram (2004) for details). 
Another critical factor affecting CRP participation is the Environmental Benefits Index 
(EBI), which in part determines the maximum price that can be paid for land offered into the 
CRP. It would have been ideal to have an EBI index available for each farm household in the 
ARMS data, but this was not the case. As an alternative, we use the EBI data from Jaroszewski 
(2000) to approximate an EBI for major ERS agricultural regions based on the percentage of 
land in the various conservation practices currently enrolled in CRP. By using these data, it is 
explicitly assumed that when CRP participation commitments were made, land was likely to be 
committed to these land uses in similar proportions.  
Empirical Results 
In specifying the empirical models, we are guided by the theoretical results from above, 
as well as from previous literature (e.g. Goodwin and Mishra (2004) and El-Osta, et al. (2004)). 
We present the results of tests of the null hypothesis that the three decisions are independent. 
Next, we discuss the factors affecting the three decisions based on the estimated trivariate probit 
model. We then move onto a discussion of the estimated household income function.  
Tests for Joint Decisions  
  To justify the use of this three-choice model, it is important to examine the estimated 
correlations between each pair of choices. From Table 3, the CRP participation decision is 
positively correlated with the off-farm work decisions of both the operator and the spouse, and 
the correlation coefficients are statistically significant. The highest of the three correlation 
  16coefficients is the one between the spouse’s decision to work off the farm with the operator’s 
decision to do the same (0.25).
8 The correlation between participation in CRP and the operator’s 
off-farm work decision is also quite high (0.17). Thus, it is perhaps no surprise that there is also a 
positive correlation between participation in CRP and the spouse’s decision to work off the farm, 
but the correlation is not as high (0.12). These results are strong evidence that these three 
decisions are made jointly, but to add further support, we test if the correlation coefficients are 
jointly equal to zero with the likelihood ratio test (LR).
9 This test is for the null hypothesis that 
these choices can be regarded as independent decisions. We reject the null hypothesis because 
the LR test statistic (53.8) is higher than the critical value (7.8) for a 5% level of significance.  
Off-Farm Work Decision by the Farm Operator 
  The decision of the farm operator to engage in off-farm work depends on characteristics 
of the farm, the farm operator, and the circumstances in the local economy (Table 3). As in much 
of the existing literature (e.g. Sumner 1982; Benjamin and Guyomard 1994), our results continue 
to confirm the fact that older farmers (OP_AGE) are more likely to work off the farm.
10 However, 
the effect is nonlinear, with the likelihood of participation increasing with the operator’s age up 
to about age 44, but declining thereafter. Although the operator’s education (OP_ED_C) has a 
positive effect on the probability of participation in off-farm work, the years of experience on the 
farm (OP_EXP) has a negative effect that increases at an increasing rate. Farm operators raised 
on farms (RAISE_OP) are also less likely to work off the farm. Since returns to off-farm labor 
are likely to be less variable than farm returns (e.g. Mishra, et al. 2002), the indication that the 
                                                 
8 Our findings are consistent with previous studies where there is evidence that decisions by farm couples to work 
off the farm are made jointly (Huffman and Lange 1989; Lim-Applegate, et al. 2002). 
9 The idea behind the test is that: if these decisions can be regarded as independent, the log-likelihood value of the 
trivariate probit model should be equal to the sum of the log-likelihoods of these three binary probit models under 
the null hypothesis. To implement the LR test, we estimated three independent binary probit models first and 
calculated the log-likelihood values for each. See Chang (2006) for details. 
10 Our result is not consistent with Whittaker and Ahearn (1991); they found that young operators were more likely 
than older operators to work off the farm. 
  17likelihood of off-farm participation is lower for farm operators willing to accept more risk (a 
negative coefficient on “RISK” in Table 3, a variable that increases as a farmer is willing to 
accept more risk) is consistent with the theory of risk averse behavior.  
The likelihood of participation in off-farm work declines with farm size (CROPSIZ1) and 
farm tenancy (TENANCY), and it is lower for vegetable or nursery operations (CROP456). The 
negative effects on the likelihood of participation of both net worth (NETWORT1) and 
participation in government programs (e.g. AMTA_A) other than CRP may reflect wealth or 
scale effects on off-farm labor supply (e.g. Goodwin and Mishra, 2004).
11 The negative effect of 
tenancy (as measured by the proportion of acreage owned) on the likelihood for off-farm job 
participation reflects a greater commitment to agricultural production (ceteris paribus) from 
operators who own their own land. Finally, there is some indication that the strength of the local 
economy, as measured by the proportion of jobs that are manufacturing (MANUF), increases the 
likelihood of participation in off-farm work. The extent to which the local economy depends on 
jobs in the trade (TRADE) sectors reduces the likelihood of participation in off-farm work.  
Off-Farm Work Decision by the Spouse 
The characteristics of the spouse, family and farm structure, and location also affect the 
choice of the spouse to work off the farm. Similar to the finding by the operator, the spouse who 
is older (SP_AGE) and more educated (SP_ED_C) is more likely to work off-farm, and the 
effect is nonlinear. We also find that the spouse’s farm experience (SP_EXP) decreases the 
likelihood of working off the farm, and the effect is statistically significant. This might well 
                                                 
11 In interpreting this result, there is certainly reason to think that the decision to receive decoupled payments is also 
endogenous. It is not possible to include a fourth decision variable in this model, or even conduct a test of 
endogeneity. However, such a test is conducted by Chang (2006) in related research involving a two-choice model of 
CRP participation and off-farm work by the operator. Using tests developed by Smith and Blundell (1986) and Vella 
(1993), they test the null hypothesis that decoupled payments (AMTA_A) are exogenous to the off-farm work 
decision. They also test the null hypotheses that the decisions to be in an agricultural district (AGDIST) and receive 
decoupled payments (AMTA_A) are exogenous to the CRP participation decision. In all cases, they failed to reject 
the hypotheses that the corresponding decisions are exogenous.  
  18reflect the opportunity cost of an off-farm job as was also apparent for the farm operator. Both 
results could also reflect a strong preference for farm work and a farm lifestyle. This logic would 
perhaps reinforce the negative effect of farm size (CROPSIZ1) on the probability of the spouse 
working off the farm. As the number of children under six years of age in the farm household 
(H_SIZE06) rises, the likelihood of the spouse working off the farm declines. As one would 
expect, it is during the years in which the children are young that the spouse will want to have 
more time at home with the young family. Finally, in areas where the local economies have a 
strong economic base, as reflected by a high proportion of employment in manufacturing 
(MANUF), the spouse is more likely to work off the farm, perhaps taking advantage of off-farm 
job opportunities that are relatively attractive compared with available jobs in areas that have a 
weaker economic base.  
CRP Participation Decision 
Participating in CRP depends generally on some characteristics of the farm, the farm 
operator, land quality, and the circumstances in the local economy. There are also some 
differences in participation by major ERS production region. The probability of participation in 
CRP increases with farm size (CROPSIZ1), but the probability of participation is lower if the 
farm is primarily engaged in vegetable or nursery production (CROP456), rather than cash grain 
production. This difference probably reflects the higher opportunity cost of removing land from 
production of the relatively high-value crops on vegetable or nursery farms.  
In addition to the negative effect of the opportunity cost of land on participation, one 
could also hypothesize that the likelihood of participation would rise with the level of the annual 
CRP payments. Unfortunately, it is impossible to include such a variable in participation 
equations such as this, because of the sample selection problem. However, Parks and Schorr 
  19(1997) argued that the maximum bid price ought to be one of the factors affecting CRP 
participation. We have no information on actual bids or bids accepted for our sample farms, but 
we do find that farm households that are located in areas where the EBI scores for land currently 
enrolled are high are more likely to participate in CRP, ceteris paribus. It is likely that in areas 
where the EBI scores were high, farmers might well expect to have higher bids accepted.  
Based on the measures of soil quality related to the general quality of the soil resource in 
the region described above, participation in CRP rises (falls) as the proportion of land in the 
surrounding county is classified as high (LQH_96) (low) (LQL_96) quality. This result suggests 
that CRP participation may be higher in areas where land is well suited for agriculture and lower 
in the areas where it is less suitable for crop production. While this result does offer some 
guidance as to the types of areas where CRP participation is high or low, it offers little 
information about the quality of land that is actually enrolled in the program. We would need 
farm-specific information on land quality to draw further conclusions about the quality of land 
actually in the program.    
There are two variables that suggest participation in CRP is related to the life-cycle of the 
farm operator. The likelihood of CRP participation increases with age (OP_AGE). Thus, as 
farmers get older, committing some land to CRP may be one way of reducing operator labor 
requirements on the farm. This may also be a way of holding onto farmland assets until they are 
needed for the retirement years, or so that they can be passed on through an estate. The fact that 
there is a positive correlation between the probability of farmers working off the farm and the 
probability of participation in CRP (an estimated correlation coefficient of 0.17) may also reflect 
a desire to reduce operator labor requirements as land is taken out of production, vice versa. 
Finally, the probability of CRP participation increases as a farmer’s education (OP_ED_C) level 
  20increases; this is perhaps an indication that investments in human capital might lead to increases 
in CRP. To the extent that these investments also lead to a greater appreciation by farmers of the 
value of the environmental benefits from CRP, these effects square with theoretical model above.  
The risk attitudes of the farm operator also affect the propensity of the farm household to 
participate in CRP. As aversion to risk increases, we would expect that the likelihood of 
participation in a program where payments are certain, such as CRP, to increase. This conclusion 
is supported by the negative sign on the variable “RISK” in Table 3 (e.g. high values for “RISK” 
are associated with farmers who prefer more risk). Furthermore, by allowing for decreasing 
absolute risk aversion (DARA), our theory is also consistent with the fact that decoupled 
payments, “AMTA_A”, reduce the likelihood of CRP participation. With DARA, farmers are 
likely to be less concerned about diversifying into off-farm income opportunities as wealth 
increases through decoupled payments. However, it is difficult to know whether the attitudes 
toward risk are driving this result, or if it is also in part due to the fact that in order to receive 
decoupled payments farmers must continue to commit certain acreage to agricultural production 
even though land need not be committed to a specific crop.  Finally, since commodity program-
related loan deficiency payments (LDP_A) reduce farm income variability, these payments 
reduce risk averse farmers’ concerns for allocating resources to programs, such as CRP.        
Participation in other agriculturally-related programs also affects the likelihood for CRP 
participation. For example, if the farmer is enrolled in a voluntary agricultural district, subject to 
a farmland preservation easement, or is located in an agricultural protection zone or an area 
zoned exclusively for agricultural use (the variable AGDIST), the farmer is less likely to 
participate in CRP. Many farmers participate in these types of programs (most of which are state 
or local programs) out of concern for maintaining their land in agricultural production in rapidly 
  21growing areas where there is competition for land for non-agricultural purposes. Therefore, it is 
hardly surprising that, ceteris paribus, these farmers would be less likely to enroll land in a 
program such as CRP that essentially takes land out of production. The fact that the likelihood of 
CRP participation falls as the proportion of population that is urban rises would seem to reinforce 
this explanation.
12 In contrast, farmers who participate in EQIP are also more likely to participate 
in CRP. Participation in both EQIP and CRP could reflect a farmer’s stewardship for the 
environment (reflected in our theoretical section) by removing particularly venerable land from 
production, while at the same time using more environmentally friendly practices on land still in 
production.   
Empirical Estimate of the Farm Household Income Function  
The estimated farm household income function is reported in Table 4, where the mean 
and variance functions are specified in linear and exponential forms, respectively. The results of 
the income equation are quite encouraging, and the estimated coefficients are generally 
consistent with our theory and other a priori expectations.  
In discussing these results, our initial interest in is identifying the extent to which 
decisions to participate in CRP and/or work off the farm affect both average farm household 
income and the variance in income across farms within the groups. These effects are embodied in 
the coefficients for the three variables that account for the endogenous treatment effects (the 
estimated probabilities of participating in CRP and working off the farm by the operator and 
spouse: PROB_CRP, PROB_OP, and PROB_SP, respectively).
13 As one might expect, household 
income rises with all three probabilities, although the effect of the probability of off farm work 
                                                 
12 Duke (2004) also found that the likelihood of participation in CRP is lower in highly urban areas.   
13 We perform a likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the predicted probabilities 
specified in both the mean and variance functions are all zero. Our likelihood ratio test result (a chi-square value of 
531) provides strong statistical evidence justifying their inclusion in the model. These probabilities, however, do 
affect the mean and variance in farm household income quite differently. 
  22by the spouse is not statistically significant. One reasonable interpretation of the insignificant 
effect of this latter probability is that the spouse may work off the farm part time or primarily to 
gain access to health insurance from the employer, or to gain personal skills (Mishra, et al. 2002). 
The interpretation of the variance function perhaps needs a bit of explanation. Since this 
variance function is based on a heteroskedastic error specification, it determines the extent to 
which the variability of household income across farm households is systematically related to 
farm and farm household characteristics, as well as the likelihood of participation in CRP or off 
farm work. Thus, all else equal, the variance in household income across farm households is 
systematically lower for those farm households which are more likely to participate in CRP or 
off-farm work (e.g. the negative coefficients on the variables PROB_CRP, PROB_OP, and 
PROB_SP in the variance equation of Table 4). These results on off-farm work square with those 
by Mishra, et al. (2002) and Mishra and Goodwin (1997) and suggest that off-farm income helps 
diversify sources of income. There is also less variability in household income among these 
farms with some off-farm income.
14 The fact that participation in off-farm work by the spouse 
reduces income variability among farms also squares with the fact that income variability is 
higher among those farms where the spouse is a home maker (SP_HMAK).  
The performance of the human capital variables seem to be consistent with the standard 
results found in the human capital and earning literature (Low and Ormiston 1991). The 
operators who are retired from farming (OP_RET) are those with lower farm incomes, but 
incomes are less variable as well. As the experience of farm operators increase (OP_EXP), there 
is a tendency for average farm household income to be lower, but there is also less variability in 
incomes across farms in this group. This former result squares with the fact that farmers with 
                                                 
14 While in our analysis CRP payments also seem to act to stabilize farm household income, we know of no other 
empirical studies that have attempted to establish this fact. 
  23more experience are less likely to work off the farm or participate in CRP. However, while those 
farmers committed to farming may have somewhat lower average incomes, this latter result may 
speak to the value of farm experience in dealing effectively with the inherent variability of 
returns from farming. Furthermore, the characteristics of the spouses also affect household 
income. Household incomes increase with the spouses’ educational levels (SP_ED_C), but 
incomes are more variable as the age of the spouse increases, all else equal.  
The effects of the farm characteristics on farm household income are also consistent with 
expectations. Large farms (CROPSIZ1) or farmers who own a large share of their farmland 
(TENANCY) have higher farm household incomes. However, this probably means that a larger 
share of household income comes from farm sources—thus explaining, at least in part, why both 
of these variables contribute to the variability in household income across farms in the group. 
Perhaps consistent with these findings is that income variability is somewhat higher for those 
farms located in areas where there is a high proportion of high quality land (LQH_96). While 
these may be productive soils, yields may be more responsive to weather and other 
environmental factors at both extremes.  
Farmers receiving decoupled payments (AMTA_A) also have higher average farm 
household incomes, which in part could be explained by the fact that decoupled payments are, in 
large measure, income transfers. Since, at most, decoupled payments would have only a modest 
effect on production decisions, it is not surprising that farm household income is less variable 
among households receiving them. The financial status of the farm household also determines 
the farm household income. As the debt to asset ratio rises (DEBT_RAT) average farm 
household falls, but not significantly so, but the variability of household income for farms with 
otherwise common characteristics falls, and the effect is significant.  
  24Conclusions and Policy Implications 
  To better understand the interaction between the farm business and the farm household, 
we find evidence that the decisions of farm operators and their spouses to work off the farm are 
made jointly with the decision to participate in CRP. We also determine how these decisions 
interact with socio-economic characteristics of the farm and farm household to affect the well-
being of farm households, as measured by farm household income, and its variability among 
farm households with common characteristics. 
Participating in CRP depends on characteristics of the farm (including the type of farm), 
the farm operator (including age, experience, and attitudes to risk), land quality, and 
circumstances in the local economy. There are also some differences in participation by major 
ERS production region. Decisions to work off the farm by the farm operator and the spouse are 
related to many of these same factors, although the direction and magnitude of some of the 
effects are quite different.  All three decisions are affected by participation in other Federal farm 
programs. Participation in CRP is affected by state and local programs for farmland retention, etc. 
Policy implications of these results are elaborated in the text.   
It is not surprising that the decisions to participate in CRP and to work off the farm affect 
both average farm household income and its variability across farm households in which the 
other farm and household characteristics are similar. The nature of these relationships has 
important implications for farmers trying to adjust to a more market-oriented farm policy 
environment. For example, our results suggest that participation in CRP and off-farm work by 
both the operator and the spouse increase mean household income, but they decrease the 
variability of household income across household with other similar characteristics. These results 
would seem to square with our expectations, since income from both CRP and off-farm work is 
  25likely to be less variable than income from farm sources. The variability in household income 
among large farms or among farms in which a large share of farmland is owned is also higher. 
This situation is likely to persist in a more market-oriented farm policy environment because it is 
on these farms that a larger share of household income comes from farm sales.    
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Figure 1: Trivariate Probit Model Specification 
  30Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Names Variable Definitions Mean  Std.
Dependent Variables 
OP If the operator worked off the farm (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.52 0.50
CRP If the household enrolled in CRP or CREP (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.23 0.42
SP If the spouse worked off the farm (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.57 0.50
INCOME Total principle household income ($1,000) 67.98 106.82
Operator and Spouse Characteristics
OP_AGE Age of the operator 55.51 13.16
OP_RET If the operator was retired (=1), otherwise (=0) 0.12 0.32
OP_ED_C Education of the operator (year) 13.01 2.45
OP_EXP Years the operator has worked on farm job 24.45 14.95
RISK Risk preference rating of the operator; =1 if risk averse, 10 if risk loving 4.45 2.41
RAISE_OP If the operator was raised on the farm (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.78 0.41
SP_AGE Age of the spouse 53.43 12.84
SP_ED_C Education of the spouse (year) 13.35 2.09
SP_EXP Years the spouse has worked on farm job 24.45 14.95
RAISE_SP If the spouse was raised on the farm (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.57 0.50
SP_HMAK If the spouse is a home maker (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.27 0.44
Farm and Household Characteristics
CROP17 If a cash grain farm, (=1),otherwise (=0)  0.69 0.46
CROP456 If a vegetable, fruit, or nursery farm, (=1),otherwise (=0)  0.22 0.42
NETWORT1 Household networth value ( $100,000) 4.72 16.24
DEBT_RAT Ratio of toal debt to total assets 0.13 0.22
NFASST1 Principle operator Household non-farm assets ($10,000) 13.96 22.49
TENANCY Ratio of owned acres over total operated acres   0.96 2.10
AMTA_A Per acre AMTA payment  5.38 12.73
LDP_A Per acre LDP payment 8.37 19.16
CROPSIZ1 Operated acres (devided by 1,000) 0.33 0.70
H_SIZE Number of household members 2.84 1.24
H_SIZE06 Number of children younger than 6 years of age 0.14 0.48
 
  31Table 1: Summary Statistics (con't)
Variable Names Variable Definitions Mean  Std.
Environmental Characteristics
LQH_96 Index of high quality land of 1996 0.33 0.25
LQL_96 Index of low quality land of 1996 0.23 0.19
EQIP If participate in EQIP (=1), otherwise(=0) 0.0032 0.0566
EBI Environmental benefit index 61.59 3.93
Locational and Local Economic Conditions
URBAN Percent of labor market area’s population living in urban areas 56.51 21.86
MANUF LMA’s employment in manufacturing (%), lagged one year 13.78 6.89
TRADE LMA’s employment in wholesale and retail trade (%), lagged one year 20.30 2.34
AGDIST If participates in local agricultural preservation program (=1); otherwise (=0)
0.04 0.20
REGN1 If located in Heartland (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.29 0.45
REGN3 If located in Northern Great Plains (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.07 0.25
REGN567 If located in Eastern Uplands, Southern Seaboard, or Fruitful Rim (=1); 
otherwise (=0) 0.30 0.46
REGN9 If located in Mississippi Portal (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.05 0.22







Table 2: Sample Distribution of Three Joint Choices 
Groups CRP OP SP Frequency %
(1,1,1) 1 1 1 200 9.51
(1,1,0) 1 1 0 59 2.81
(1,0,1) 1 0 1 74 3.52
(1,0,0) 1 0 0 142 6.76
(0,1,1) 0 1 1 555 26.40
(0,1,0) 0 1 0 285 13.56
(0,0,1) 0 0 1 366 17.41
(0,0,0) 0 0 0 421 20.03
Total 2,102 100
Note: Weighted with full sample weights.
  32Table 3: Trivariate Probit Model Estimation
Variable Coefficient Std t-value
Constant -3.67 0.70 -5.26
OP_AGE 0.24 0.02 11.72
OP_AGESQ -2.59 0.18 -14.18
OP_ED_C 0.06 0.01 4.39
OP_EXP -0.05 0.01 -5.29
OP_EXPSQ 0.00 0.00 4.24
H_SIZE 0.00 0.03 -0.06
CROPSIZ1 -0.55 0.03 -17.43
RAISE_OP -0.47 0.10 -4.56
MANUF 0.01 0.01 2.53
TRADE -0.04 0.01 -3.04
AMTA_A -0.01 0.00 -2.85
LDP_A 0.00 0.00 -1.07
RISK -0.03 0.01 -1.70
NETWORT1 -0.01 0.00 -2.07
SP_HMAK 0.49 0.08 5.98
CROP456 -0.88 0.10 -8.91
REGN3 0.04 0.15 0.27
REGN567 -0.16 0.08 -2.04
TENANCY -0.04 0.03 -1.60
Constant -5.70 1.48 -3.85
OP_AGE 0.03 0.00 9.57
OP_ED_C 0.08 0.02 4.85
LQH_96 0.54 0.23 2.35
LQL_96 -0.96 0.34 -2.79
EQIP 1.11 0.40 2.77
AGDIST -1.18 0.26 -4.55
EBI 0.06 0.02 2.49
AMTA_A -0.03 0.00 -5.92
LDP_A -0.01 0.00 -5.24
RISK -0.06 0.02 -3.14
CROP456 -1.96 0.26 -7.48
CROPSIZ1 0.23 0.04 5.56
REGN1 0.19 0.11 1.68
REGN567 -0.30 0.15 -2.03
REGN9 1.31 0.27 4.77
URBAN -0.01 0.00 -7.45
For OP Choice Equation
For CRP Choice Equation
 
  33Table 3: Trivariate Probit Model Estimation (con't)
Variable Coefficient Std. Dev. t-value
Constant -2.84 0.73 -3.89
SP_AGE 0.13 0.03 4.67
SP_AGESQ 0.00 0.00 -6.92
SP_ED_C 0.16 0.02 9.02
SP_EXP -0.01 0.00 -1.88
H_SIZE -0.10 0.03 -2.99
H_SIZE06 -0.26 0.09 -2.90
CROPSIZ1 -0.14 0.05 -2.60
RAISE_SP 0.14 0.07 1.94
MANUF 0.02 0.01 2.69
AMTA_A 0.00 0.00 -1.24
LDP_A 0.00 0.00 -0.39
NETWORT1 0.00 0.00 -0.99
CROP456 -0.88 0.09 -9.45
REGN3 0.14 0.17 0.86
REGN567 0.12 0.08 1.64
RHO(OP,CRP) 0.17 0.05 3.16
RHO(OP,SP) 0.25 0.05 5.28
RHO(CRP,SP) 0.12 0.06 2.00
Log-likelihood -2792.44
LR Test* 53.86
*The null hypothesis is :RHO(OP,CRP) = RHO(OP,SP )= RHO(CRP,SP) = 0.
  The critical value is: (x
2(0.95,3)=7.815)
For SP Choice Equation
Correlation Coefficients
 
  34Table 4: Estimated Stochastic Household Income Function 
Variable Coefficient Std t-value
Constant 0.24 20.07 0.01
OP_RET -14.78 4.30 -3.44
OP_EXP -0.28 0.15 -1.93
SP_AGE -0.07 0.23 -0.32
SP_ED_C 4.29 0.83 5.16
CROPSIZ1 7.39 2.99 2.47
TENANCY 10.60 2.40 4.42
CROP17 -5.14 4.43 -1.16
AMTA_A 0.35 0.08 4.20
DEBT_RAT -5.85 8.56 -0.68
URBAN 0.16 0.08 1.99
TRADE -1.02 0.64 -1.58
REGN567 6.93 4.26 1.63
PROB_CRP 24.29 9.29 2.62
PROB_OP 18.40 9.95 1.85
PROB_SP 2.89 12.59 0.23
Constant 3.29 0.51 6.44
OP_RET -1.02 0.14 -7.04
OP_EXP -0.02 0.00 -5.75
SP_AGE 0.02 0.00 4.61
SP_HMAK 0.33 0.08 4.44
CROPSIZ1 0.18 0.03 6.30
TENANCY 0.20 0.02 10.28
AMTA_A -0.01 0.00 -5.14
DEBT_RAT 0.22 0.06 3.74
NFASST1 0.02 0.00 18.68
LQH_96 0.26 0.15 1.79
URBAN 0.01 0.00 4.31
REGN567 0.17 0.08 2.13
PROB_CRP -1.18 0.20 -5.78
PROB_OP -0.28 0.20 -1.42




Note: PROB_CRP, PROB_OP,PROB_SP are predicted probabilities.
* The null hypothesis of the LR test is: prob_crp = prob_op = prob_sp = 0.
  The critical value is: (x
2(0.95,6)=12.59).
Mean Function
Variance Function
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